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Abstract
This note analyzes the Bertrand duopoly with constant but asym-
metric marginal costs on a market with homogenous products. It is
shown that there exist some equilibria that are ignored in the litera-
ture on IO. In addition, in this setting (perfectly or nearly perfectly)
competitive equilibria exist.
JEL: D4, L13
The Bertrand duopoly with homogenous products plays an important role
in modern industrial organization. Firstly, because of its analytical simplic-
ity and the characteristics of the equilibria it is a standard part of modern
textbook contents. Secondly, it shows that under some particular conditions
even duopolies can induce perfectly competitive results. Thirdly, perhaps due
to its comfortable handling it is often used as an essential part in multistage
games. ”Bertrand competition is interesting because it depicts a polar case.
It represents what we have in mind when we think of sharp small-number
competition.” (Tirole, 1988, 212).
One popular and often used variation of the basic Bertrand model is of
special interest. This is the Bertrand duopoly with homogenous products and
unequal production costs of the duopolists. It has commonly been argued
that cost inequalities reduce the degree of competitiveness in equilibrium as
the more efficient supplier can realize positive profits in equilibrium. In this
note I shall try to show that this is not necessarily the case.1 In the following
∗The author would like to thank Harald Wiese for an important hint.
1Somewhat conversely to this paper Baye and Morgan (1997) and Baye and Morgan
(1999) show that under certain circumstances there exist equilibria with strictly positive
profits in the symmetric Bertrand duopoly.
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section I introduce the basic Bertrand model with cost inequality and present
the usual equilibria. In section 2 I show that there exist further equilibria
with more competitive outcomes. The note is closed with some concluding
remarks.
1 The usual analysis of Bertrand duopoly with
homogenous products and cost inequality
Let us analyze an industry with two suppliers, firm 1 and firm 2. Their
production costs are given by Ci = ciqi for i = 1, 2 with c2 > c1. Firms
simultaneously compete in prices and offer homogenous products so that
consumers always buy from the firm that offers the lowest price. Let market
demand be given by q = D (p) with p = min (p1, p2). Firms individual
demand functions are given by
qi =

0, pi > pj
D(pi)
2
, pi = pj
D (pi) , pi < pj
, i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Thus the firms’ profit functions are given by pii = (pi − ci) qi (pi, pj) with
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Assume further that ∆ is the smallest monetary unit
so that costs and prices have to be a multiple of ∆, i.e. ci, pi = λ∆ with
λ being an integer. This assumption, of course, only serves to circumvent
problems with the existence of equilibria that arise if we allow for continuous
prices. Let ∆ be arbitrarily small so that the following two conditions are
met:
1. c2 − c1  ∆,
2. (p−∆− c1)D (p−∆) > (p− c1) D(p)2 for all p ≥ c1 + 2∆.
The first condition ensures that there are multiple feasible prices between
c1 and c2. Condition 2 implies that underbidding the other firm by ∆ is
profitable as long as profits remain strictly positive. Finally assume that there
is no drastic cost advantage, i.e. c2 < p
mon
1 with p
mon
1 being the monopoly
price of the low cost firm. As usual, Nash equilibria in pure strategies are
used as the equilibrium concept. The standard solution of this game is given
by
Proposition 1 Given the assumptions above, there exist two equilibria.
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1. Equilibrium 1 is characterized by p1 = c2, p2 = c2 + ∆. Consequently,
the quantities of firm 1 and firm 2 are given by q1 = D (c2) > 0 = q2
and profits are pi1 = (c2 − c1)D (c2) > 0 = pi2.
2. Strategies in the second equilibrium are given by p1 = c2 −∆ and p2 =
c2. The corresponding quantities and profits are q1 = D (c2 −∆) > 0 =
q2 and pi1 = (c2 −∆− c1)D (c2 −∆) > 0 = pi2, respectively.
Proof. Omitted.2
If we model prices as a continuous variable in the above model, then,
strictly speaking, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies (e.g. Wolf-
stetter (1999, 73)). However, if we change the rationing rule for the case
of equal prices of firm 1 and firm 2 then the existence problem vanishes.
For example, assume that the individual demand functions are changed as
follows:
q1 =

0, p1 > p2
D (p1) , p1 = p2
D (p1) , p1 < p2
and q2 =

D (p2) , p1 > p2
0, p1 = p2
0, p1 < p2
.
Here it is arbitrarily assumed that in case of p1 = p2 the high cost firm
does not produce and the low cost firm gets all demand. With this new
rationing rule and continuous prices the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 In the continuous version of the Bertrand duopoly with the
modified rationing rule the strategy combination p1 = p2 = c2 constitutes
an equilibrium. The corresponding quantities and profits are given by q1 =
D (c2) > 0 = q2 and pi1 = (c2 − c1)D (c2) > 0 = pi2.
Proof. Omitted.
Furthermore, Wolfstetter (1999, 73) emphasizes that one can regard the
equilibrium in continuous strategies as the limit equilibrium of the discrete
strategies model with an ever decreasing value of ∆→ 0.
This is where the story typically ends.3 At least the author is not aware
of any contribution that goes beyond the analysis that has been presented so
far. However, there are numerous other equilibria of the Bertrand duopoly
that have not been mentioned so far.
2E.g., see the standard texts of industrial organization such as Wolfstetter (1999, 72-
74), or Shy (1995, 109-110), in conjunction with the Errata for the first edition, available
under http://econ.haifa.ac.il/˜ozshy.
3E.g. see Shapiro (1989, 344), where he describes ”the” Bertrand equilibrium.
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2 Some other equilibria
In many discussions of the Bertrand duopoly scenarios with prices below
marginal costs are not analyzed in detail. Often simple plausibility arguments
are presented with the aim of ruling out such a behavior. Two textbook
examples may serve as evidence: (1) ”At any such price, firm 2 would choose
to produce zero ...” (Varian, 1992, 292); (2) ”In equilibrium, each firm must
make nonnegative profit. Hence, pbi ≥ ci, i = 1, 2.” (Shy, 1995, 110). Both
arguments seem to be intuitively clear and convincing. However, a closer
look makes clear that they do not suffice. The first of these statements is
certainly correct but still misses the point! In Bertrand duopolies players do
not choose quantities but prices! Therefore, a quantity of zero does not imply
prices at or above marginal costs. The second statement is incorrect. It is
true that both players have nonnegative profits in equilibrium. However, the
”hence” is not valid. For example, if p1 = c1 then c2 > p2 = c1 +∆ induces
nonnegative profits, too.
The basic insight is that any p2 > p1 makes sure that firm 2 does not
produce and that its profits are equal to zero. This is independent from
the absolute magnitude of p2. Consequently, it may be possible that in
equilibrium p2 < c2 as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the discrete version of the Bertrand duopoly there are
(c2− c1)/∆ equilibria in pure strategies. In particular, any strategy combina-
tion
(
pN1 , p
N
2
)
that satisfies c2 ≥ pN1 ≥ c1 + ∆ and pN2 = pN1 + ∆ constitutes
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If c2 ≥ pN1 then firm 2 cannot gain by underbidding firm 1
because it will make losses. Furthermore, all p2 > p
N
1 induce zero profits.
Consequently, p2 = p
N
1 +∆ is a best reply of firm 2 to firm 1 playing p
N
1 ≤ c2.
If firm 2 plays pN2 = p
N
1 +∆ ≥ c1 + 2∆ then firm 1 gets all demand and
realizes a strictly positive profit. As prices are already below their monopoly
level further price decreases cannot lead to higher profits. A price increase
by ∆ leads to an equal division of demand among the duopolists. However,
we assumed that ∆ is sufficiently small so that (p−∆− c1)D (p−∆) >
(p− c1) D(p)2 for all p ≥ c1+2∆. Consequently, firm 1 cannot increase profits
by increasing its price and sharing demand with its competitor. Even further
price increases by firm 1 would induce a demand of zero and zero profits, too.
Hence, p1 = p
N
2 −∆ is a best reply of firm 1 to firm 2 playing c2+∆ ≥ pN2 ≥
c1 + 2∆.
Summarizing, within the given range, pN1 and p
N
2 are mutually best replies
and thus constitute a Nash equilibrium.
4
We can derive a corresponding result for the model with continuous prices,
too. Again, assume that the modified rationing rule is valid, i.e. if both
duopolists offer the same price duopolist 1 (with the lower costs) gets all
demand. In this case we get the following equilibria:
Proposition 4 In the continuous version of the Bertrand duopoly there are
multiple equilibria. In particular, any strategy combination
(
pN1 , p
N
2
)
that
satisfies c2 ≥ pN2 = pN1 ≥ c1 constitutes a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. If c2 ≥ p1 = pN1 ≥ c1 then all p2 ≥ pN1 are best replies of duopolist
2 to firm 1 playing pN1 . Hence, p2 = p
N
2 = p
N
1 is one of the best replies of
duopolist 2. Furthermore, if p2 = p
N
2 ≥ c1 then it is always optimal for firm
1 to offer a price p1 = p
N
1 = p
N
2 , i.e. p
N
1 is a best reply to p
N
2 . As p
N
1 and p
N
2
are mutually best replies they constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1 Note that the equilibria that have been shown in the preceding
four propositions often have firm 2 equilibrium strategies that are weakly dom-
inated.
• All ”new” equilibria with p2 < c2 are characterized by firm 2 equilib-
rium strategies that are weakly dominated by other strategies, e.g. by
strategies with p2 > c2.
• However, the same is true for all but one of the ”traditional” equilibria.
In particular, equilibrium 2 of Proposition 1 (discrete strategies) and the
only equilibrium in Proposition 2 (continuous strategies) are constituted
by weakly dominated firm 2 strategies.
We have shown that in the simple Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric
costs there exist many more equilibria than commonly stated. Equilibrium
prices include all feasible prices between c1 and c2 (in the continuous case).
As a consequence, the Bertrand paradox need not vanish when costs differ
between duopolists as is commonly argued in the literature.4
3 Conclusion
The main result of this note is that in the asymmetric Bertrand duopoly with
constant marginal costs there are numerous equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies that have been ignored in the literature on Industrial Organization.
As these equilibria are derived quite easily it is rather implausible that they
4E.g. see Tirole (1988, 211).
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have not been found by somebody else before. Unfortunately, the author
was unable to find a source in which these equilibria are mentioned5 and,
quite obviously, most other authors are not aware of their existence either.
Therefore, it seems justified to present this finding (once again?).
It remains to be discussed how important the ”new” equilibria may be.
First, the use of weakly dominated strategies in a Nash equilibrium always
looks somewhat implausible. Still, the strategy combination remains a Nash
equilibrium and as the literature on refinements has not been overwhelmingly
successful there does not exist a widely accepted procedure to sort out such
equilibria. Furthermore, in many games weakly dominated strategies need
not be regarded as implausible.6 This is particularly true when ”Bertrand
behavior” is used as a punishment strategy in multistage games. Finally, and
maybe most important, it is inadequate to discriminate against the ”new”
equilibria by the criterion that they comprise of weakly dominated strate-
gies because this criterion is also valid for widely accepted equilibria of the
Bertrand game!
Obviously, the adequacy/plausibility of weakly dominated equilibrium
strategies depends on the details of the game in question. Without the
availability of a reliable general rule about how to select among equilibria we
also have to take into account the embeddedness of the game theoretic model
into the real economic situation that is going to be explained. Consequently,
we must not ignore some equilibria ex ante. This, in turn, means that the
”new” equilibria presented in this note deserve sufficient attention.
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